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The first-quarter GDP growth number was on expected lines, but given the gaps in the availability of data for April and May, conjecturing the exact number was guesswork. A fall of (-) 20 per cent looked likely and though the number is a bit higher, it does not change the conclusion that the economy has slumped sharply due to the lockdown.
The contraction observed in seven of the eight sectors reflects how deep the problem is. Public administration was expected to grow at a positive rate given that the fiscal deficit was much higher in the first quarter of the current year relative to last year (83.2 per cent against 61.4 per cent). This did not happen, and the reason is quite straightforward — higher government spending was in the form of transfer payments rather than spending on goods and services, which resulted in a negative growth number. The other sectors — manufacturing and services — have been in the negative zone across the board, which again is quite expected.
Growth for the full year is likely to be in the region of (-) 6.4 per cent, which is premised on a low negative growth number for the first two quarters for certain, possibly a close to positive number in the third quarter and positive growth in the last quarter. This assumes that around three-fourths of the economy would be able to operate at a capacity utilisation rate of 65-70 per cent. The balance of 25 per cent of the economy, which would be in the services category, would probably still be struggling in the fourth quarter. Based on the first-quarter performance, these scenarios remain unchanged.
Two basic factors would influence the assumptions being made on the growth prospects for the coming quarters. The first is the process of “Unlocking”. It has been observed that with the economy moving from the stage of a total lockdown in April to a gradual opening up of the windows in May and June, and then the door opening up a little more significantly in July and August, the movement from one stage to another did reflect in the macro-economic numbers. For instance, though the PMI number for manufacturing remained in the negative terrain — being less than 50 for the first four months of the current year — it crossed the 50 mark in August. Therefore, there has been an improvement on a month-on-month basis. The same holds for the index of industrial production (IIP), which though negative in the first three months, has witnessed less intensity: From (-) 57.6 per cent in April to (-) 33.9 per cent in May and then (-) 16.6 per cent in June. This is in line with the opening up of activities across the country.
While it is reasonable to assume that the “Unlock” process will be positive for the economic sectors, there is no assurance that there will not be localised lockdowns, as the course of the pandemic is unknown. The Centre has made strong statements on this issue, but the states could end up taking specific decisions. This affects economic activity as supply chains, which span the entire country, get impacted sharply. Also, business units are not confident about starting or expanding their business.
For services, the issue is clear. Most services involve social interaction and thus following distancing norms is always going to be a challenge. Hence, completely opening up services like hotels, transport (airlines and railways), tourism, and entertainment would be low on the list of opening up and thus recovery of output in these areas would be sluggish.
In real estate, which is an integral part of the services segment, there are multiple sets of challenges — one of which is “real”, while the other is a change in the mindset. For construction activity to begin, there need to be projects and labour on the supply side, and demand. The present stress on home loans can hinder a revival in residential real estate. The work-from-home ethic has caught on. The thinking today is that this can be a trend in the future and will affect demand for property and leases. Putting these factors together, the revival of the services sector would be prolonged as compared to manufacturing.
Opinion | Covid-19 shock and inadequate policy responses have compounded India’s economic problems
The second factor which will play a role in the economy’s growth prospects in the coming months is the possibility of a revival package from the government. There have been some hints given by officials that something could be on the cards. This can be a course changer for the growth trajectory. So far, support from the government has been more through the indirect route, where food relief for the poor has been combined with more aggressive lending by the financial system with guarantees in different forms. To boost growth presently, there should ideally be some additional capital expenditure by the government which goes beyond what has been provided in the budget. This seems to be the logical solution as the first quarter GDP numbers show a decline in both consumption and investment. By increasing capex, the government can begin a virtuous cycle of creating assets as well as providing employment. This will create a dual impact on the economy.
Overall, economic growth would be in the negative terrain in the near future, though the pace of the decline will ease. This will be contingent on how soon the unlocking process reaches the state where the pre-COVID situation is restored. Reaching the same threshold looks unlikely given the spread of the virus and moving to the positive growth zone may be possible only in the fourth quarter. There is definitely a possibility of the (-) 6.4 per cent number being revised further downwards depending on the evolving conditions. But the government can certainly make a difference by altering its stance on fiscal policy, going in for some pump-priming. It may not be too late even now.
The negative growth number in the GDP was expected and hence this was not really a surprise. But it does raise a broader question on whether anything can be done to turn the tide. The second quarter is also probably going to witness a similar de-growth, though the intensity will be lower. As things stand today, the economy is just waiting for the monthly unlock guidelines, which opens the door, albeit in a limited manner. This is understandable, since the infection cases have not yet peaked and the likelihood of their increasing further looks real. In such a situation, can anything be done?
The answer is that the onus is on the government to do something different. The private sector is just not able to provide any support for the growth process for several reasons. First, there is excess capacity in industry, as demand has slumped and hence there is no need to invest more. Second, infrastructure activity has virtually come to a standstill and only and unless a push is given can the private sector play its role. Third, the private sector, especially the SMEs, are already at the corner when it comes to repaying banks, and the end of the moratorium means that there will be more caution shown when borrowing from banks. Fourth, the banks and NBFCs, on their part, are less willing to lend to industry at this point of time, as evidenced by the surplus funds being deployed in the reverse repo auctions.
There is hope that there will be a revival in consumer demand. This too has limitations. First, several people have lost their jobs already, due to the lockdown. Second, there have been pay cuts across the board, which means that willingness to spend is low. This has already created problems for the leveraged households, as servicing bank loans is getting tougher. Therefore, while the ‘pent-up demand’ theory may work to an extent during the festival time, it cannot be anywhere close to what is normally witnessed. The expectation of rural demand to revive is palpable, given the good monsoon, but it would be necessary for price realisation to be commensurate with the output. In the past, higher kharif output has led to prices falling. Besides, in these uncertain times, the rural folk may prefer to save in gold, rather than spend. At any rate, it cannot drive growth of the economy and at best, can sustain rural demand.
Under these circumstances, there is a call for the government to do something special. So far, the government has played the role of enabler of growth and created conducive policies for the private sector to operate. In the economic relief package, barring the food relief given, the rest was driven through the financial system, with the government’s role being restricted to a certain quantum of guarantees to SME and NBFC loans. While this has been beneficial for sure, it has not added to demand, which is lacking in the economy. The option is to go in for some extraordinary spending, by expanding the fiscal deficit.
Intuitively, it can be seen that in case the government spends Rs 1 lakh crore, that would be around 0.5 per cent of the GDP, which can add to overall spending. Ideally a sum of Rs 2 lakh crore, which is 1 per cent of the GDP, should be ploughed in immediately on projects. The government has spent on the NRGA programme, but this would be more in the nature of transfer payment, where there is no concrete GDP added. This is one of the reasons why the contribution of the government sector in the GVA for Q1-FY21 had shown a decline of 10.3 per cent even as fiscal deficit mounted. The spending must be real.
The advantage of government capex is that it creates a virtuous circle. First, spending on roads, railways, power projects, urban development creates demand for cement, steel and so on. These industries get a heads-up, straightaway. Second, all these projects require more labour, which leads to job creation. Third, the second order effects work out as the steel and cement companies increase their demand for related raw materials and hence complete this virtuous link. All this while, the household consumption increases, as jobs created offer income to be spent.
Therefore, the government needs to go in for a shift in ideology on the fiscal deficit. Presently, it is conservative in terms of sticking to the FRBM path. This must change. The fiscal deficit for the year has been put at 3.5 per cent for FY21 and going by only the revenue slippages,would end up at 7-8 per cent of GDP. This is the time when the entire world is going in for more aggressive fiscal action, which also includes cash payments to households to stimulate demand. Pushing the envelope by another one per cent of the GDP may not really do harm and will be acceptable even on global discussion tables, as this is the norm in the present context. More importantly, this is the only feasible way out.
The GDP growth number for the April-June 2020 quarter the fiscal year 2020-21 (Q1FY21) was expected to be dismal and the estimates varied from 15-30 per cent. The contraction of 23.9 per cent during this period is a clear reflection of the slowdown caused by the shutdown in March 2020, which was virtually total in April and opened only gradually in the subsequent two months.
The only sector to show growth is agriculture, while the government sector disappointed with public admin de-growing by 10.3 per cent. Agriculture has been relatively immune to the lockdown and it is only post July when there has been more movement permitted across states that the Covid-19 infection has spread, albeit marginally. Therefore, it has been business as usual for this sector and with the Rabi harvest coming in has registered growth of 3.4 per cent.
The government accounts till June 2020 do reveal that revenue expenditure has been aggressive, especially covering the relief to the poor and NREGA programmes that gets reflected here. However, it is unfortunate that running a high fiscal deficit for the first quarter has not resulted in value accretion for GDP. This is something that the government needs to look at.
The other sectors have been in the negative zone, especially services, which have trailed due to the lockdown and the limited ability to operate in several states. Industrial activity comprising mining, manufacturing and power have all moved into the negative growth territory with the inter-linkages being distinct. Lower growth in manufacturing due to the lockdown and supply disruptions has lowered demand for electricity that gained more from residential consumption, and which, in turn, affected demand for coal and hence the mining sector. Construction was impacted by both the issue of stoppage of projects as well as migration of labour. This will get further constrained due to the seasonal factor of monsoon in the second quarter.
On the expenditure side, quite expectedly again, both the consumption and investment stories read alike. The lockdown went with job losses and salary cuts that affected consumption, which also gets reflected in these lower numbers. Also, the investment rate as denoted by the gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) number was down to 19.5 per cent from 28.9 per cent – one of the lowest witnessed in the last decade. Quite clearly, the lockdown impacted investment activity as it was physically not possible to continue with projects which came to an end – both public works and residential construction. Also, private investment was constricted with the lack of demand which did not provide an incentive to invest.
There are expectations that the rural demand story plays out in Q3FY21 when the festival season starts and the Kharif harvest comes in. Presently, indications are that crop sowing is progressing well and output would be good. The crux is in farmers realising better prices and hence income. This must work out well as this is one factor India Inc is banking on as well. Also, the government action on extension of food relief or any additional stimulus will be awaited to turnaround this number.
Restructuring of loans is always a debatable issue as it runs the risk of adverse selection. In this game, both the bank and the borrower are comfortable with the concept. The borrower gets extensions in various forms while the banker can defer recognition of the non-performing asset, save on provisioning and, hence, capital. The government too is happy with this solution as the NPA levels are lower and India Inc is not complaining. It is a pareto-optimal situation. But, the critic’s view is that such actions only kick the can down the road, as restructuring allows us to run away from the obvious. It is just deferring the problem as money not paid is default, whichever way one looks at it.
There is evidently a perverse incentive to go for such restructuring, so there is a need for objectivity in selection. Normally, such decisions are taken by the lenders, and the majority-rule among them becomes the overriding factor. In the present situation of several companies and industries being affected by the shutdown, objectivity should be used to select the candidates. While the current crisis calls for universal restructuring, it should be consciously done, by separating the companies which have been hit by the pandemic and its fallout from those which were not doing well, yet require assistance as they have been pushed further back. The ones which were non-performing prior to the lockdown also require legitimate support as they can turn the corner if restructuring is done judiciously.
Some of the following parameters can be used for separating this chaff. First, a cut-off date for companies which were standard assets on the books of banks that turned negative due to the lockdown can be decided. This is something already included in the RBI policies, where March 1 can be used as the threshold. If companies were not performing at this point, they would go into category B, which can then have differential solutions.
Second, companies which have taken the moratorium in March should get precedence as these assets were recognised as being under pressure right from the beginning. Hence, in terms of hierarchy, additional weight can be given here.
Third, the financial performance in Q1 of the present year must be evaluated in terms of sales and expenditure growth besides interest cover ratio and profitability. This will reflect how much the company has been impacted in this quarter over the last five quarters. Comparisons with the Q1 and Q4 quarters of FY20 would be important. Here, most companies will qualify as the results have been dismal for most sectors.
Fourth, industries need to be segregated based on different operational levels as of a cut-off date, which can be either June or September. Some like pharma, FMCG and IT were working even during April, albeit to a limited extent, and those like hospitality, tourism, entertainment are virtual non-starters even today. By such categorisation into industries that have been ‘most’,’ moderately’ and ‘less’ affected by the shutdown, a stepdown view becomes possible.
Fifth, the prospects of the industries need to be independently worked out, probably by credit-rating agencies as their view is unbiased. This will help to put companies in various buckets of time taken to reach normalcy. The advantage here is that the tenure for restructuring can be ascertained. For example, if independent research shows that real estate will revive in March 2021, while entertainment only in October 2021, the loan restructuring can be differentiated. The time would not be uniform for all industries as is being done for SMEs. Having a uniform time for this exercise could give benefits for extended periods.
Sixth, loans that must be restructured can be bracketed into categories based on the interest cover ratio across different size groups of credit. The restructuring exercise would involve changing the tenure for repayment as well as changes in the interest rate. The banks must be involved as this affects their commercial profitability. The tenure and interest rate can be linked to the size of the loan. A different norm can be set for smaller size loans.
Seventh, the restructuring package would have to be made conditional. These would have to be in terms of curbs on dividend payment, pay packages of the management, operational expenses like travel, etc. Also, commitments to trade creditors would have to be adhered to. This is essential as all companies would like to go in for such an exercise, especially if the tenure is extended and interest is lowered. The conditions would restrict the free-riders.
Eight, any restructuring of loans of a company would also entail sanctioning of fresh loans as the former only repackages the loans which help companies survive. But, for growth, fresh loans will have to be advanced to ensure that the company is back on the growth path. The extent to which fresh loans can be given can be linked with the fourth factor.
Nine, to make the new credit feasible for banks and viable for the borrowers, the government must provide a credit guarantee in an analogous manner, as has been done for the SMEs. This can again be sector-specific for well-defined time periods. This will protect banks in the future and can be done selectively.
Last, the restructuring of loans will evidently mean a loss for banks as any loan that is not serviced on time involves a cost. It is a zero-sum game. The government would have to contribute, with interest subvention targeted at sectors where the exercise involves lowering of interest rates by more than 200 bps. This cost should be shared between the two.
Having an objective approach, which is driven by formula rather than subjective judgments of the lenders would make the exercise more transparent. The first five parameters mentioned could be used to derive the formula, while others would form the structure of such deals. A system which allows for subjective judgments carries with it the disadvantages that go with ‘groupthink’, where all merely agree because others do. The principled approach will be more targeted, as the more vulnerable sectors could get more liberal terms. Also, as stated earlier, restructuring on the grounds of Covid-impact holds for both the standard and impaired assets at the cut-off point. Both require attention. The formula-driven process will clearly define the perimeter of allowances to be made.
Hence, based on the ten parameters stated here, a weighted score can be assigned by running an algorithm to find out which companies qualify for the restructuring plan and the terms therein. There would be less room for subjective judgments here as the terms of engagement are pre-decided. The government also would have an important role to play here by both providing a guarantee selectively as well as providing for an interest subvention so that banks do not have to bear the entire cost.
Futures trading in agricultural commodities was always at a disadvantage when it came to reaching out to farmers. The reason is straightforward. A farmer can sell the crop in advance at a known price on the exchange but if the price on the day of sale is higher, he cannot go back on the contract. An option gives the seller this right; but once it was allowed on the ‘futures price’, it became complicated for the farmer to comprehend. Therefore, the idea of getting in ‘options on goods’ which is not on the futures but the spot price makes a lot of sense and shortens the distance, as it were, between the farmer and the exchange.
NCDEX has launched three contracts, which is noteworthy. There is no reason why farmers should not go in for such trading as it is the same as the MSP (Minimum Support Price) with a small difference. On the positive side, the farmer can sell at a known futures price and in case the spot price on the day of settlement is higher, he need not go with the trade. This will eventually hold for all crops even where the MSP is ineffective. The downside is the loss of the option premium. These options can be made available across all commodities and geographies and have the potential to change the landscape of agricultural marketing.
NCDEX, a commodity futures exchange has a spot exchange, NCDEX e-Markets Ltd; together, these can offer integrated solutions for the farmer. Basically, the options transaction will protect the farmer against the downside like the futures price. However, if the spot price is higher on the settlement date, the farmer need not go ahead with the contract and should be allowed to seamlessly switch to the e-market platform and sell the product. The two exchanges should ideally connect the platforms for the farmer so that the optimal price is received. This is just what the farmer would want — the best of both the worlds.
The establishment of such contracts must be supported at the back-end by logistics which includes transport, storage, grading, assaying and packing. This will provide an end-to-end solution for the farmers. Simultaneously, the contract specifications must be aligned to the farmers’ output and while NCDEX starts with 10 MT as the specification, should ideally be of a lower quantity to involve class participation.
To make this successful, there must be an expansion of the delivery centres with all the infrastructure facilities to enable trading. Also, trading terminals must be made available in all connected geographies for participation to increase. Mass education is required which must be not just through lecture series which is the norm but by having trading facilities in the villages.
The brokering community can take a lead here and needs to be incentivised to do so. Having terminals in all the major towns around the delivery centre can have lower transaction charges to begin with.
The model looks good but the challenge of getting the farmer to use these platforms remains. Ideally, the top 10-20 trading centres in the top five producing States of wheat should have delivery centres as well as trading facilities. While the latter is easier to achieve, the former is not. For such a plan to work out, it is necessary for the State governments as well as WDRA (Warehousing Development and Regulatory Authority) to get involved because creating infrastructure can never be the job of a commodity exchange which is barely able to meet its commercial viability parameters given the complex nature of agriculture.
Governments — both Central and State — need to be geared to this reality because if they can create these structures, the financial commitments in the form of subsides can be brought down significantly over time as the market provides the best deals to the farmers.
The government has been proactive in terms of revoking the APMC laws and allowing farmers to sell across boundaries. But this will be ineffective unless access is provided, and hence even for the concept of e-Nam to work, such connectivity is necessary. The onus is quite clearly on States to make the ‘options on goods’ concept to work or else it can become another wasted exercise. Corporates should have free access to buy these goods on the platforms of commodity exchanges which will cut down on intermediation costs.
In fact, if the options on goods concept works out well, the government can reconsider the MSP and procurement concepts. Farmers could just be getting a higher price on the exchange and may not require such continued support.
The government could also become a buyer on the exchange platform to meet its buffer stocking norms. Such a market will allow for procurement across all States and not get restricted to those centres where the FCI operates.
There can be no argument against the commercialisation of agriculture. Given the strength in terms of production, India can be a major exporter of farm products. For this to happen we need to strengthen the links between production and sale; the present initiative of SEBI to let the exchanges launch options on goods is significant as it also closes on the other end involving sale.
The logistics chain is the weak link which must be developed through state action. This will require investment and incentives to set up warehouses and grading and assaying facilities. It will lead to creation of several jobs in rural India which is missing today and ensure that migration is curbed.
The government will also gain as the need to subsidise will come down and the process of procurement and storage of surplus grains is checked.
Hence, options on goods should be extended to all farm commodities as the potential to create this virtuous circle is huge. But for this to happen, state support is required right from the Centre to the panchayats. Given the ‘will’ seen today at these levels, it does look achievable.
The Q1FY21 results of the corporate sector were always going to be of interest. That’s not just because of declining sales and profits, which can hold for most sectors that were not allowed to function at an optimal level, but also because of how the salary bill moved. Ever since the lockdown announcement, several companies decided to go in for cost rationalisation, and the staffing component was the first casualty.
The logic was that, as there was no or limited production of goods and services for an indefinite period, there was no reason to foot the full salary bill. Further, as companies were not sure about when these bans would be lifted, they had to suspend operations and could not bear this cost. At the lower level, comprising unorganised labour, the lockdown meant that the migrant population was on the road. For those in the organised sector, different measures were used to lower the salary cost.
First, the headcount was reduced depending on the estimates made internally on what should be the optimal level of staff for the year. Those in the services industry, which involved social interaction, were the most-affected as the first strains were witnessed even before the lockdown was formally introduced. Airlines industry, for example, had cut down on the salaries of their staff even before the lockdown. Second, there was a systematic reduction in the salaries of employees, and various modalities were used. There were no pay-cuts for those at the lower level—Rs 5 lakh per annum or lower. But, as one moved upwards in the echelon, salary-cuts in the range of 5-30% were invoked. Third, knowing very well that the company would not be doing well, increments were held back or annulled for the year. Besides, as Q4FY20 and full-year FY20 results showed, most companies were in the red, with declining top line and profits; so, there was a reason not to give increments. Last, with a bit of accounting flexibility, the variable portion of the salaries of staff was cut on account of company performance.
In the corporate world, a substantial part of the salary is often in the form of variable pay, which is linked to the company’s functioning. Those responsible for sales targets tend to have a higher proportion of their salary in this form. For the others, the parameter is often the overall performance of the company. This is a discretionary part of the salary, and, hence, can be tweaked to lower total salary outflow. A combination of zero or lower increments and sharp cuts in the variable pay can reduce the cost outflow on employees.
The FY21 first-quarter results reflect all these aspects to a certain extent. The results announced so far indicate an interesting pattern. While the aggregate salary bill for around 560 companies indicate a growth of 3.7%, from Rs 1.20 lakh crore to Rs 1.25 lakh crore, the pattern across sectors is quite stark. The accompanying table presents the growth in this component in 26 sectors.
It shows that sectors affected by the lockdown for a longer period have also been affected more in terms of rationalisation of staff cost. Also, those sectors which still have not witnessed any major relaxation in their operations, have been pushed back further. Realty, auto, media, hospitality have all been pushed back on this account. Out of these, the service-oriented industries confront the impediment of uncertainty. This also means that, going ahead, there could be further cuts, especially in headcount in these sectors. The pattern so far has been that companies first invoke salary cuts, and when operations cannot be resumed or are severely constrained, go in for a reduction in headcount.
On the positive side, the industries which witnessed an increase in the salary bill were banking, IT, healthcare, agro-based. These continued to do well as their operations are categorised as essential goods and services. Chemicals and plastics are intermediary goods that go in the production of essential goods. Hence, they also witnessed marginal growth.
A precondition for any revival in employment and restoration of pay packages must be the removal of lockdowns permanently. In fact, the periodic localised lockdowns push many sectors further back and are a concern for companies. Corporations will be better able to draw their production plans, which includes the deployment of labour, if there is a certainty of operations. For instance, theatre-owners being told that opening of theatres with a graded SOP will be allowed from, say, December onwards is far more preferable than having the local government blowing hot and cold over the resumption of such services. Therefore, it is essential to have an exit plan communicated to all production units.
A fall in salary payouts for companies has implications for the banking and NBFC sectors. There has been a tendency in the financial system to move towards the retail segment, to protect against the build-up of adverse asset portfolio post the NPA crisis, which was recognised in 2016. The assumption was that while one big-ticket default in infrastructure can set the bank back significantly, it was less probable that there could be such large scale defaults on the retail front.
However, Covid and the lockdown has changed these dynamics. RBI’s Financial Stability Report highlights the high proportion of retail loans availed of the repayment moratorium; as of April 2020, this was around 55%. Intuitively, borrowers who opted for such a moratorium would be challenged to service their loans when their incomes are part of this large segment of sectors where salary payouts have come down. Therefore, declining salary payouts is a concern for both the reflection of employment growth as well as income sustenance, which affects debt-servicing ability. This is one area which would merit more discussion when the issue of restructuring of loans comes up in this segment.
The picture on the employment front is, hence, quite grim. The organised corporate sector has, per force, reduced salary payouts, and quite sharply. This will impact the future consumption of the concerned households amid uncertainty. Also, for the debt-laden households, meeting debt-servicing commitments post-moratorium will be a major concern.
A book by a former governor of the RBI is always awaited, as was the case with the two governors before Urjit Patel. When you start reading a book by a former policy maker, you tend to expect a kind of autobiography where the singular tense dominates. Urjit Patel’s book is refreshingly different and quite hard-hitting, as he debates issues as both a former RBI governor and a critic. Showing a great deal of maturity, he focuses only on issues and not persons.
The nucleus of his treatise is the functioning of government banks, which have been leveraged for purposes that go beyond the scope of prudent, leading to what he has called ‘fiscalization’ of the sector. It is not surprising that these banks are starved of funds, requiring government intervention time and again, which becomes challenging as there is limited fiscal space. In between there is a roadblock where the regulator has its hands tied when it comes to regulating one part of the regulated, which is the PSBs. Hence too much government, too little fiscal space and absence of independent regulation typifies the trilemma.
The title Overdraft exemplifies such recklessness where deposits are not deployed judiciously. There is a chapter on the blame game when it comes to NPAs, which everyone has shied to talk about. His argument is that five stakeholders each have a role to play in this mess. First the government encouraged banks to lend money under the label of capital deepening where several sensitive sectors got funds, which failed. PSBs did not have heads to run at times which affected governance. The same held for boards.
Second, the RBI was lacking in not doing rigorous stress testing and questioning the assumptions of such lending. It also failed to ensure that banks had their risk management processes in place. More importantly, the central bank allowed for restructuring, which was quite calamitous.
Third, banks had to take the blame for being less than competent as they lent money without due diligence. The restructuring route helped them cover up. Fear of the 3Cs made them defer such recognition. These are the three known stakeholders.
Patel talks of two other parties that are responsible, which is noteworthy. The first are various industry associations that have never criticised the defaulters. Here he points out in another chapter that one of the reasons as to why banks maintain higher spreads on deposits is that they must provide for these NPAs, which, in turn, impinges on capital. Hence the cost is spread across all borrowers. Therefore, India Inc cannot shun responsibility and just keep quite, as it affects everyone.
Second is the media and here he bares it all by saying that news channels regularly dish out awards to leaders of banks who have been hauled up by RBI for wrongdoing, which makes a mockery of everything. A question raised is: Is sponsorship of annual awards and banking conclaves worth the implicit condoning of wrongful actions? Readers will certainly now look at all these awards with more scepticism.
Patel does argue against farm loan waivers and supports agri reforms, which have a more long-lasting effect on the lives of farmers. Similarly, there is a chapter on governance and less interference from the government when it comes to PSBs. Here he flags an important issue, of the RBI having no power when it comes to PSBs, which was making headlines even when he was governor. This anomaly must be corrected if we are to show any improvement in this sector as regulation becomes difficult. What holds for private banks does not for PSBs, which is why problems get exacerbated in this segment.
Patel also brings to the fore a fundamental problem in Indian banking or rather the financial sector where there has been what he calls ‘fiscalization’ of the banking sector. A pertinent question that he has raised is that why is it that our budget documents lay down targets for the banking sector or even issues like MUDRA loans and the achievements thereof. This does not happen in any other country. Further, government financial institutions are used for implementing fiscal programmes and here quite clearly the allusion is to LIC being involved in several disinvestment manoeuvres.
Another interesting chapter that will make you think harder in these Covid times is the one called, “The empire strikes back”. In a way he shows how serious we are when it comes to resolving the NPA mess. The RBI’s famous February 2018 circular as well as PCA notification that were meant to bring about quick resolution and refrain banks from lending came to nothing, as the events which followed showed. The RBI ruling was annulled, and banks were recapitalised again so that they could lend more, as they came out of the PCA framework, to vulnerable sectors like real estate and SMEs. The big push being given to lending in these Covid times looks altruistic today, but the possible future outcome can be scary, which almost all banking analysts fear, as we may be going back to the old days.
Patel’s book is a must-read for everyone and hopefully the fault lines pointed out by him in various pockets of the system are addressed by the stakeholders concerned. He has propounded his 9Rs approach for tackling the quality of assets issues, starting from recognition to reform. These have served as the building blocks of his treatise. The red flags raised by him must be taken seriously or else it could just be retro times for the banking system.
'Atmanirbhar India’ is more of an extension of the ‘Make in India’ campaign which was run around half a decade back by the government. Both these epithets emphasize the importance being given to make India a strong power that can stand up on its own and get integrated with the global powers on the economic front. The idea is to make India strong economically and socially. Hence it is not a case of import substitution but one for making the country a major force which is respected and relied upon to drive the world economy.
Atmanirbhar also carries with it a strong social message which has been followed up by the government with some strong economic policies that support these structures. This relates to health and education. Since India went in for economic reforms in 1991-92 the focus was on the economic sphere where a myriad of policies brought a radical change in the way in which we operated with the market forces showing the way. But these two segments were never in the forefront and the entire gamut of policies were more focused on the ‘growth’ agenda than development. This is where the present Atmanirbhar reforms make a difference. It integrates the social compulsions with the economic imperatives.
To build a strong economy it is necessary to have a well built and learned workforce. Economic reforms have built on the technology block quite successfully. However, it should be recognized that technology is an enabler and can never be the driver of growth in a labour surplus economy. Therefore, it is necessary to start the process at the initial level which is education. Here the government has come out with the New Education Policy which emerges after a hiatus of three decades (34 years to be precise) and lays the foundations of the education structure that is required to take the country forward. Primary education is lacking and the emphasis on rote learning which served its purpose years back needs to be improved upon significantly with more sophistication to make progress. The NEP does just that. While the restructuring of the school system is welcome, the policy could have addressed the issue of having a uniform curriculum across the country, which would have provided a level playing field for all.
The government has also realized the importance of digital learning and through sheer serendipity has been emphasized at the time of the lockdown when the entire country was in the mode of operating from home. Digital education has the power to disseminate finer learning across the country and physical presence is less relevant. The ‘One nation, One platform’ scheme of Diksha would add value by bringing all children to one level by 2025 which was not possible otherwise. This should help in preventing the dropout rate for children especially at the secondary school level where it is as high as 1/3 in some states like Assam and Bihar.
The challenge, however, would be to create commensurate jobs for everyone as they reach the age of maturity and this is where the focus on different sectors which were part of the Atmanirbhar Bharat package will provide for. Today the literacy levels in the country or the percentage of children with school or college education does not map with their employability as very often the level of learning is rudimentary. The reforms witnessed in agriculture, irrigation, public sector, mining, infrastructure, etc. would bring about higher growth to finally offer employment opportunities to an educated class. The government through the NEP has hence quite rightly also spoken of vocational training so that there is practical skill development which takes place for these children.
Along with education, the government has also focused a lot on health which is essential to ensure that the former goal can be achieved. The Indian record on health, especially at the children level, has not been good with malnutrition being a malaise leading to stunted growth which comes in the way of prospects. It has been estimated that 38% of children below five years of age are stunted. The same holds for rudimentary diseases like dysentery, typhoid, diphtheria, etc. which leads to a relatively high mortality rate in children. This has to be addressed and while the responsibility is on both the central and state governments, it is quite in order that Atmanirbhar programme has targeted health as a goal. The investment in public health will be increased along with investment in grass root health institutions of urban and rural areas. The National Digital Health Blueprint will be implemented, which aims at creating an ecosystem to support universal health coverage in an efficient, inclusive, safe, and timely manner using digital technology.
Therefore, by linking education and health with economic growth a virtuous link has been strengthened. If implemented universally across all states in the country, the foundations of the preconditions for growth would have been cemented. This must be a continuous process and would require dedicated effort especially at the village level to ensure that these two social goals are met. There is evidence to show that several schemes like building toilets, providing work under NREGA, direct benefit transfer, PM Health scheme, mid-day meal schemes etc. have worked very well in some states. This must be made universal as at the end of the day a healthier and better educated society will add to the prosperity of the state.
The transfers from RBI to the government is always keenly watched. This year the RBI Board has approved a transfer of Rs 57,128 crore to the government as against Rs 1.48 trillion in 2018-19 and Rs 40,000 cr in 2017-18. Last year it was higher due to the additional formula driven transfer of reserves to the central government. It was a one time transfer and hence the benefits are not recurring to the same extent.
The amount may not be very significant in terms of supporting the government finances as it would be around 0.25% of GDP against an expected fiscal deficit of close to 8% for 2020-21. However, given that there are likely to be slippages on other accounts such as tax revenue and disinvestment in particular, this is useful. Also the transfer at this point of time is critical as the government does require funds to meet various commitments.
Interestingly, the Budget had targeted an amount of Rs 89,000 crore from RBI, PSBs and FIs. Hence this amount would contribute significantly but may not be able to help reach the target as the profits from the other two components may not be attained. Banks may have to resort to the restructuring programme and deferred NPA recognition options to make lower provisions and hence reveal higher profit. Also it must be noted that the RBI has said that given the facilities extended by the central bank to banks, payment of dividend this year would not be there in which case the government would get affected. Against this background, the amount could be considered to be lower than what may be have been expected by the government. There could be limited upside given the decision to maintain the contingency risk buffer at 5.5%.
The issue of RBI transfers to the government has become important of late as it is a large amount and comes from the normal course of central banking activity. In a year where the RBI has a larger LAF programme, there would be a tendency for more money to be earned by the central bank. Conversely in FY21 for instance where the RBI has been more active with the reverse repo, the net earnings could be lower as payouts would be more than receipts from repo (LTRO, TLTRO).
There was debate last year on transfer of reserves of the RBI to the government and the Bimal Jalan Committee had drawn up a formula. Hence the bulk of the stock of reserves which had to be transferred were invoked. From then on it would be only the surpluses of the RBI which would vary depending on the interest rate regime and liquidity operations. When large OMOs are conducted as were in FY19 there was a tendency for earnings of the central bank to increase which pushed up the surpluses. FY20 has been typified by both low interest rates and surplus liquidity which work in favour of borrowers and not lenders.
It does look like that going forward the RBI may be a steady though not hyper-active provider of funds to the government. The only way out would be if there is direct lending to the government where the latter pays interest to the central bank which comes back as transfer of surpluses. This could open the door for debate again.
There is a call for greater RBI intervention in the market. This is over and above the TLTROs invoked in the past. Such intervention is from the point of view of funding the government deficit as well as private sector requirement. Let us see how these arguments work. At present, the government borrows in the market because direct monetisation of the deficit is not permitted. However, if there is a liquidity crunch in the market, RBI goes in for open market operations where certain securities are bought by the central bank from banks. The securities now get transferred to RBI, and banks get the requisite funds. Therefore, reserve money increases, but it is in an indirect form even though the result is the same given the central bank becomes the holder of government debt.
This is explained as being part of the monetary policy mechanism through which the central bank manages liquidity. Before this process came into play, there was a system where the government would place paper directly with RBI under what was called private placement and the market was never involved. Once the WMA (ways and means advances) became institutionalised, the private placement route was out of the system.
The call today is for the government to go in for higher spending to provide a fiscal push. The argument is that the extra money required to pump prime the economy—at 1% of the GDP, this could be Rs 2 lakh crore—is not funded by the market but by RBI. Laws have to be changed for this, but the advantage of doing so is that the market is not affected by such a transaction as it is a kind of loan given by RBI, which, if in the form of securities, can be released at a later date into the system. In times of surplus liquidity (as seen today), RBI can sell these securities through OMOs. If the same borrowings were made through the traditional channel, the tendency would be for yields to increase as there is a surfeit of paper in the market which pushes down prices and increases yields. The direct RBI route eschews this transmission. Hence, there is merit, from the market perspective, in getting RBI to finance the deficit directly.
Alternatively, if given as a loan and not as securities, the issue is bilateral one, where the government services the debt over a time period (can be 10-20 years) and there is no market effect. In fact, the money can be lent at the bank rate as it is to the government, and the cost can be kept down. This does not look proper for the traditionalist as it may sound to be a violation of prudence. It will be a case of RBI printing money to finance the deficit which happens in some of the more slippery nations of Africa and Latin America, which, in turn, has been responsible for hyperinflation. But it is an option which can be justified as being a response to a ‘once in a lifetime’ pandemic.
The other is to get RBI to buy non-government paper, and provide liquidity like the QE packages in the West. Under QE, the central bank purchased commercial bonds in the form of MBS, ABS etc, and provided liquidity to banks. The argument hence is that, instead of only government paper being taken for an LTRO, this can be done for corporate bonds for a long period of time. The problem is not of liquidity, but one of risk-aversion. The TLTROs were for a specific purpose, and, hence, there was liquidity to be had. However, the fact that the last auction did not receive adequate bids indicates that while funding was not an issue for banks, lending was. Therefore, even if RBI decides to buy, say, AAA-rated corporate bonds of PSUs from banks that are completely safe, banks may not be willing to on-lend these funds to lower-rated companies, and would still opt to cherrypick their customers. Therefore, RBI doing a QE by buying corporate paper may not quite work out.
Conceptually, there is also the unknown of how RBI would have to account for bonds which default in the market. At present, bond-holders must pay the price for such defaults. RBI, as a non-commercial entity, must work out these possibilities when buying such paper. Also, the MTM issues would have to be addressed as prices of such paper can change in either direction, affecting RBI’s portfolio.
The crux is to solve the problem of how sectors like aviation, automobiles, real estate, hospitality, etc, could be assisted by RBI. The TLTRO was a good concept, but if the funds were to be invested in bonds of the targeted sector, the experience shows that they move to the better-rated companies that had no challenges in finding investors to begin with.
The solution here can be using a ‘one-time’ approach. We had a one-time transfer of RBI reserves to the government in the past. We are also talking of a one-time financing of the fiscal deficit of the government with RBI lending directly to the state. The same can be done where the bank advances credit to the banks as the TLTROs are used specifically for lending to the targeted sectors. Here, it is not the bond market being used, but direct loans in the normal course of banking business. The advantage for banks is that such loans would be funded by cheaper funds. The same can be packaged as refinance at repo rate for banks within specified limits. Here, the commercial risk is still borne by the bank, but the higher spread will encourage such lending. Therefore, just like how there is export refinance, there can be auto, hospitality, aviation, etc, refinance. SIDBI and NABARD have been provided with loans for refinancing MFIs and SMEs. The same can be done directly by RBI through a new window.
The present situation is clearly extraordinary, and there is a requirement for some kind of engineering that has to be done. The crux is to ensure that it is restricted to just this year and not extended, whether it is for funding the government or for resuscitating the vulnerable sectors. Prolonging any such measures runs the risk of making it progressively difficult to withdraw, as is the case with QE where any talk of rollback can affect sentiment. And maintaining the posture of QE makes the measure ineffective. Hence, the irony is that while QE has ceased to work to revive economies that went for it in a sustained manner, but any withdrawal becomes fraught with the risk of generating market nervousness.